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ABSTEACT
This paper considers a simple variable-threat model of bargaining
intended to explain the unusual discontinuous strike threatened by the
Major League Players Association in labor negotiations in the Spring of
1980. The model shows that, because the difference between owners'
income and players' salaries varies over time, a strike of this sort
can arise as an optimal threat on the part of the players. We also
consider optimal lockout threats on the part of the owners. The model
shows that, when no strike insurance is available, the unique Mash
equilibrium of the resulting game involves both a threatened strike
and a threatened lockout. However, when strike insurance is available,
and in situations in which it is profitable for the owners to purchase
it, the unique equilibrium involves a (possibly discontinuous) threat-
ened strike but no threatened lockout.

I won't even attempt to understand the hyphenated
strike, the one week off, the six week on and the
indefinite off again. ... (Phil Niekro) said he
thought it was "a helluva move". He didn't say why.
He could have enlightened me a great deal if he had.
Furman Bisher
The above quote, made by a sportswriter in a well-known sports
publication, refers to the 1980 labor problems which confronted Major
League Baseball. On December 31, 1979, the Basic Agreement, the
general contract between the team owners and the major league players,
expired. Through three months of bargaining, no progress was made on
the several issues involved. The players voted on April 1 to strike
the remaining games of the exhibition schedule, but to return to work
for the first six weeks of the regular season and to again go on strike
May 23 if negotiations were still deadlocked. At 5 a.m. on Friday
May 23 the owners acquiesced and an agreement was reached, averting the
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second part of the players' strike in literally the final hours.
The threatened discontinous strike appears to have been unique in
the history of labor/management negotiations. Clearly there was confu-
sion on the part of many people closely connected with the game of
baseball; the above quote indicates that a highly respected baseball
writer was unable to see what, if any, logic lies behind the type of
strike threatened.
This paper attempts to explain how such a strike threat could, in
fact, be an optimal strategy on the part of the players. A simple
variable-threat bargaining model will be examined in the context of the
salient institutions of baseball. Both parties will choose a threat;
these threats vjill be carried out in the event that no agreement is
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reached. Obviously, both parties will choose the threat which offers
them the most advantageous bargaining position. The fact that the
owners' revenues vary over time can lead the players to optimally
threaten a discontinuous strike during the periods of maximim differ-
ence between owners' income and players' salaries. Consideration of
some of the more prominent, and unique, characteristics of professional
baseball will aid in understanding why we do not observe such discontin-
uous strikes in other industries. We also examine the conditions under
which the optimal response by the owners is to threaten a lockout, and
when it is more profitable for them to forego this option and purchase
strike insurance instead.
The first section of the paper outlines the relevant institutional
facts. The second section presents the bargaining game. The model is
simple; it is intended to show that under the special characteristics
present in the baseball industry, a bargaining model can point to an
interrupted strike as the dominant threat strategy on the part of the
baseball players. The last section concludes with some observations
and speculations relevant to the complex issues involved in the baseball
contractual problems and the general phenomenon of a discontinuous strike
threat.
I. THE ISSUES IN CONFLICT
The Basic Agreement is the general contract between the owners of
the team franchises and the players; it is a general contract form which
must be adhered to in each individual player's contract. Renegotiation
of the Basic Agreement takes place every four years.
By far the single most important issue in the 19R0 contract nego-
tiations was the compensation for "free agents." Until 1977 the Basic-
-3-
Agreement contained a section called the Reserve Clause which granted
owners monopsony power over players under contract to their individual
team; players either accepted the terms offered by their present owner
or left baseball entirely. Legal cases prior to the negotiation of the
1976 Basic Agreement forced the owners to allow players the ability to
become "free agents" and have their services bid for in a re-entry draft.
In the 1980 negotiations, the owners wanted to partially restrict the
freedom of players in the free agent market; the players obviously were
opposed to such a contract as it would transfer economic rents from the
players to the owners.
While there were several issues in contention, the issue of free
3
agency was clearly the central problem. Both sides displayed consid-
erable resistance to any compromise of their basic demands. As a re-
sult of this deadlock, the players voted to strike the last week of
spring training exhibition games and then play the regular season games
until midnight May 22, whereupon they would go on indefinite strike until
4
a new Basic Agreement was finalized.
The first part of the discontinuous strike in the 1980 confronta-
tion cost the owners the revenue from 92 exhibition games; the players
lost no salary as their salary does not begin until the start of the
regiilar season. The timing of the second segment of the strike was just
prior to the Memorial Day weekend, traditionally the start of the large
attendance gains baseball experiences as summer begins. Additionally,
nationally televised games increase around this time.
The ovmers were not without any recompense. It is known that they
have strike insurance, although information as to the exact details of
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the strike insurance policy is not available. However, it was reported
that the insurance benefits are an estimated 1 million dollars per day
to the owners as a group, after a two week deductible period.
In the next section, we present a simple bargaining model which per-
mits analysis of the effects of the special institutions of the baseball
industry. These key aspects are threefold: (1) the players' salary is
constant over time, (2) the owners' revenue is variable over time, and
(3) the owners have strike insurance. We show, under a reasonable set
of assumptions, these facts can lead to a discontinuous strike threat
by the players and the absence of a counter threat by the owners.
II. A Simple Bargaining Model
The two parties in the negotiations, the Major League Players As-
sociation (the Players) and the Owners will each be modeled as risk-
neutral individuals (i.e., expected income maximizers) involved in a
two-stage variable-threat bargaining game. In the first stage of such
a game each party chooses a threat
, to be carried out if the subsequent
negotiations fail to produce an agreement. The threats chosen by the
two parties in the first stage of the game thus determine the outcome
of the game in the event that no agreement is reached in the second
stage.
The second stage of the game can then be modeled as a fixed-threat
bargaining game, consisting of a pair (T,d) where T is a subset of the
plane representing the set of feasible expected payoffs to the parties,
and d = (d^, d„) represents the payoff which each party will receive in
the event of a disagreement, in which case the threats made in the first
stage will be carried out. That is, the rules governing the second stage
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of the game are that the two parties may agree to any payoff vector
X = (x , x„) contained in the feasible set T (in which case the Players
and Owners receive expected income x^ and x- respectively) , but if the
two parties fail to reach an agreement, their threats from the first
stage are carried out, resulting in expected incomes d- and d^.
Thus it is the second stage of the game which determines the final
outcome, and the payoffs to the two parties. The goal of each party in
the threat stage of the game is to choose the threat which he anticipates
will influence the outcome of negotiations in the bargaining stage as
favorably as possible.
In what follows, we will model the expected outcome of a fixed-
threat bargaining game (T,d) by a function f = (f^ , f-) called a
solution , which can be interpreted as telling us each party's expected
utility for playing the game (T,d). That is, if f(T,d) = (z , z.) , then
z = f (T,d) is the Players' expected utility and z. = f2(T,d) is the
Owners' expected utility for playing the game (T,d) in the negotiation
stage.
In order to be able to explicitly model the problem facing the
two parties at the threat stage, we will take the solution f to be equal
to Nash's (1950), (1953) solution F, such that F(T,d) = z is the point
(z- , z-) in T which maximizes the geometric average of the gains avail-
g
able to the players. The problem facing the Players will be to decide
on what kind of strike (if any) to threaten, while the problem facing
the Owners is what kind of lockout (if any) to threaten. For ease of
exposition, we will attack the problem in two parts. In Model A, we
vi-ill derive the optimal strike threat of the Players for the restricted
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game in which the Owners cannot threaten a lockout in response; in
Model B we will derive the equilibrium conditions for determining optimal
strike threats and optimal lockout threats when both are possible.
A. The Model In the Absence of a Lockout Threat
Let R denote the total economic rent generated by the scarce re-
source of Player talent over the life of the contract under negotiation
(the rent distribution for the current season is excluded as the Players'
salaries have been previously determined). Let a be the share of this
rent which accrues to the Players where
_f_
a £ 1. It is this total
free agent rent (R) whose distribution (a) is at issue. Let
N = {0, 1, . . . n} denote the n + 1 periods to be considered. Specif-
ically, let each period represent one week; thus period zero represents
the last week of the exhibition game schedule and the first week of the
9
Players' threat horizon.
In the event of an agreement a, Player income is
n
(1) I (a) = la. + aR
P i=0"
where a. is the Players' salary in period i. We can rewrite (1) as
I (a) = no + aR
P
since the salary during the last week of spring training, a^, is zero,
and the salary in any given week of the regular season is a constant:
a. = c for i = 1, . . . , n. Likewise, we can write Owner income for
an agreement a as
(2) I (a) = E a. + (l-a)R
i=0 ^
-7-
where a. is the Owners' profit in period i including their share of the
previously determined distribution of rents for this season.
In the event of no agreement by the end of the season, we shall
assume that a is determined by a random variable A, with known mean a-.
The assumption that a is determined by a random variable is meant to
capture the (subjective) uncertainty of the bargainers regarding the
ultimate resolution of the conflict if a state of disagreement persists.
The assumption that the mean of this (subjective) random variable is
known and is shared by both bargainers is a convenient simplification
adopted to avoid the additional complexity which would result if we made
the more realistic assumption that neither bargainer knew for certain
how the other bargainer evaluated persistent disagreement. If, instead,
we had modeled it as a game of incomplete information, the cause of
discontinuous strike threats would be no different than in the simpler
model we consider here. The difference between the two models would
show up in the predictions they make about how often (and why) such
threats might be carried out. Additionally, we consider the existence
of an insurance policy which pays a benefit to the Owners in the event
of a strike.
The Players may choose a strike S, of the form
S = {s. , S2 s, } C {0, 1, . . . , n}
where s. e S indicates that the threatened strike includes period s..
The Players' strategy set SS is thus of the form
SS = {S = (s , s„, . . . , s } C {0, 1, . . . , n}}
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Since we are assuming for the moment that the Owners cannot threaten a
lockout, they have no strategic choices. Their strategy set SS^ has a
single element.
SSq = {L={(j)}}
If there is a strike during periods S = {s-,...,s,}, the Players' in-
11 .
come IS
(1') I (S) = Z a + a^R = na - T. a + a-R
P ifS _s .
s .its 1 s .eS 1
1 1
or
I (S) =
r(n-k)a + KqR if O^S
I
(n-k+l)a + a_R if OeS
The Players earn their constant salary, o, over all periods (except
spring training) in which they are not on strike. The Ovmers earn
income a, in any period i not in S and collect insurance benefits
h in each period after the first 6 deductible periods of a strike.
That is, the Owners' income in the event of a strike during the periods
in S, is
(2') I (S) = I a. + [k-6]\ + (l-a-)R
" i^S
" "
where we define
[k-&]'^ = inax{0,k-6}
-9-
Note that a, where i^S is assumed, for simplicity, to be independent
of S. That is, we ignore any possible effect of a strike in period j on
12
j+r
The set T of feasible payoff vectors is:
(3) T = {x=(x^,X2) I (0,0) <. {x^,x^) 1 (I (ct),lQ(a)), jl a <. 1}
If the Players choose S = {s^ , . . . s, } and no agreement is reached,
the outcome is defined as the disagreement payoff d(S) where
13
(4) d(S) = (dj^,d2) = (Ip(S),Ip(S))
The payoff function in this threat game can now be defined as
(5) n(s,0) = (n^(s),n2(s)) = F(T,d(s))
The Nash solution to this game can be written:
/ n n(na + R, 1 a.) if d, - d^ > na + R - Z a.
i=0 ^ 1 .
-
j:=o 1
(6) F(T,d) = <;
fW-l-d^-d2 W-dj^+d2
if
no + R - E a. > d, - d» > na
i=0 ^- ^ 2-
Z a. - R
i=0 "
V (no, E a. + R) if d^ - d„ <_ na - E a. - R
i=0 ^ 1 ^ ^^Q 1
where W is defined as the total vzealth available to both parties; i.e.,
V. ^ Za . + nc + R
i=0"
Figure 1 shows the set of feasible payoffs, T. If no strike is
threatened, but disagreement occurs, the rent will be distributed according
-10-
A
to the random variable A, with mean a^; this results in point B. If
the Players establish a threat S in this model, and if no agreement is
reached, the disagreement point d(S) will result. Equation (6) indicates
that once the two parties have established their threats, the antici-
pated agreement gives the parties equal gains over their disagreement
payoffs, resulting in expected payoff point F(T,d(s)) in figure 1.
Note from (6) that the Players' payoff F (T,d(S)) is an increasing
function of d^ ~ ^9* Thus, the Players' dominant strategy is to choose
S so as to maximize d- - d„ (this has the effect of moving d(S) to the
southeast in figure 1). Now,
Za.+R
1
T.a,
1
\B
1
>?(T,d(s))
na na+R
Figure 1
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(d^-d.) = I (S) - I.(S) = Z a, + a^R - ( E a.+[k-6]\ + (l-a )R).
So
(7) d,-d, = I (S) - I,(S) = [ E (a -a )-[k-6]\] + (2a -1)R
No te that only the term in brackets in (7) depends on S = {s^, s-. • • • s, }.
Let S* = {s *, . . . . s* ^ ) be an ordering of the periods
{0, 1, . . ., n} such that (a . -c . ) > (a . - a .)>... >
^1^1 ^2 2
(a ^ - ^ ). That is, S* = {s*^ , . . . s* ^ } is not ordered
^ n+1 ^ n+1
"
chronologically, but rather in descending order of the difference between
Owners' income and Players' salary. We use this ordering with equation
(7) to establish the following theorem.
Theorem 1
The Players' optimal threat strategy is to strike during periods
S(h) defined by
s*,eS(h) iff a , - a . >
1 s«, s*, —
(8)
s*e S(h) iff a^^ - a^^ ^0
6 6
s* eS(h) iff a - >.h
°^. ^ 6+1 ^ 6+1
s* eS(h) iff a . - ak s*^ s
Proof
Let S = {Si,s„, . . ., s, } and S' = SU{s, ^A . We will need to12 k k+1
consider two cases.
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Case 1: k > 6
From equation (7),
So
I (S') - I-(S') = I (S) - I_(S) - (a^ -a^ ) - h
P p s^_^^ s^^^
I (S') - I„(S') > I (S) - I-(S) if and only if a -a - h > 0.
P - p
^
s^^^ s^^^
But this is so if and only if s,
.
, belongs to S(h). Thus, the threat
K.+i
S = S(h) defined by (8) maximizes [I (S)-I-(S)] over the set of strikes
which involve 6 or more periods.
Case 2 :
k < 6
From equation (7),
I (S') - I_(S') = I (S) - I.(S) - (a^ - a^ )
P
°
P
° \+l \+l
So I (S') - I„(S') > I (S) - I_(S) if and only if a -a > 0,
P
°
P
°
. \+l !k+l
which, again, occurs if and only if s,^ belongs to S(h). Thus, S
maximizes I (S) - Ip(S) for all _< k
_^
n+1, which suffices to prove
the theorem.
This model, without any threat options available to the Owners, has
described an optimal threat strategy on the part of the Flayers. For the
case where k
_>. <5 their dominant strategy is to threaten the strike
^
i( it if ic ^
S = {s^,s„,
. . ., s, } such that a. -a. -h>0 for all s, e S andi ^ k s* . s*. — 1
a, -o. -h<0 for all s.^S.
s-* . s*. i
1 1
In the 1980 baseball negotiations, the Players chose to strike the
last week of the exhibition schedule and then play baseball until May
23, whereupon they would again go out on strike. Model 1 explains this
hyphenated strike under the following conditions:
-13-
i) a^ - h >
ii) a. - a - h < for all periods i on or before May 22, 1980
iii) a. - a - h >_ for all periods j after May 22, 1980
Condition i) requires the Owners' income in the last week of spring
training games to be greater than the insurance benefits. Conditions
ii) and iii) require that for all regular season periods prior to May 23
the strike benefits are adequate to compensate the Owners for their loss
in revenue, while after that date the insurance is insufficient to pro-
vide full compensation. In light of early season weather conditions
as well as the fact that television revenues jump at the end of May, it
is reasonable to conclude that the Players understood the optimal threat
17
stragegy.
B. The Model with the Possibility of an Owner Lockout
Now consider the case when the Owners may threaten a lockout. The
set of feasible payoffs is still given by equation (3), and the payoffs
to the parties in the event of an agreement are still given by equations
(1) and (2). Additionally, the Players' strategy set is still
SS = {S = (0, 1 n}}.
Now, however, the Owners' strategy set includes the possibility of a
lockout in certain periods. We denote the strategy set of the Owners
as
:
SS = {L = {£^, i^, ..., £^} C {0, 1 n}}
In the event that no agreement is reached, the disagreement payoffs,
d(S,L), corresponding to threats (S,L) are
-14-
(1") I (S.L) = Z a + o-R
and
' E a, + [k - 6]\ + (1 - af.)R if L = {<}>}
il^SUL ^ "
(2") I- (S.L) -
/ E a, + (1 - a.)R if L ?f {<^}
(^l^SUL ^ "
a
Eqiiations (1") and (2") state that neither the Players nor the Owners
receive any income during periods in which either a strike or a lockout
occurs. Additionally, (2") states that the Owners receive no payments
from their strike insurance if they engage in a lockout.
After threats S and L have been chosen, the payoff to the two
parties (in the negotiation stage) is given by
(5') ir(S,L) = (Tr^(S,L),Tr2(S,L)) = F(T,d(S,L))
where d(S,L) = (I (S,L), Iq(S,L)) and F is given by equation 6.
Examination of (2") indicates that if L = {(ji} then both
dj_(S,L) = dj_(S,(t>) = Ip(S,(^), and d2(S,L) = d2(S,*) = Iq(S,<j.)
are given by equations (1') and (2'). Thus the Players' best response
to the choice L = {iji} is the strike S(h) derived earlier in Theorem 1.
If the Owners threaten a lockout L={£., ...£}?'{i|)} then they
receive no insurance payments. By equation (6), the Players still want
to choose a strike threat as to maximize d. (S,L) - d»(S,L), which is
equal to
(9) dj_(S,L) - d2(S,L) = Ip(S,L) - Iq(S,L) = [E(a^-a^)] + (2ap-l)R.
i^UL
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An argiment precisely similar to that of Theorem 1 shows that the optimal
strike threat in this case is S(0); i.e. to strike in every period i such
that a. - CT. > 0.
1 1 —
The Owners, in turn, must choose among all possible lockouts in order
to find the best threat. From Theorem 1 it is clear that the Owners want
to choose L so as to minimize the Players' advantage, ^-,-^2 ^^ given by
equation (9). Among the set of non-empty lockouts (L?^{(j)}), an argument
analogous to that given in Theorem 1 yields the following result.
Lemma 1 : The strategy L = {Z^, . . ., l^} defined by l^eL
if and only if a - a < dominates all other strategies L such
i i
that £.eL ^ {(})}.
1
The owners are left to consider only two choices - the 'optimal'
lockout L=L, or no lockout at all: L = {(})}. If they choose L, the re-
suiting equilibrium of the game is (S(0),L), in which a disagreement
would result in all games being cancelled by either a strike or a lock-
out. In this case, the disagreement payoffs are
d = (T (S(0),L),I-(S(0),L)) = (0,0) and the payoffs in the negotiation
P
stage are Tr(S(0),L) = (F^(T, (0,0)) ,F2(T, (0,0) ) )
.
If the owners choose L = {(j)}, then they receive per period insurance
payments of h in the event of a disagreement: the resulting equilibrium
is (S(h),(j)), with disagreement payoffs and final payoffs as calculated
in Model A.
Thus the O^^mers will choose to threaten a lockout only if
F^(S(0),L) >_ F2(S(h),(})). Conversely they will only choose to buy strike
insurance if F (S(h),ci!) > F (S(0),Li as only in this case will they
be able to derive any benefits from insurance. The fact that the O^^mers
-16-
have purchased insurance can be taken as evidence that
F. (S(h),<i)) > F-(S(0),L). The optimal decision by the Owners in the
threat stage of the game is not to threaten a lockout, but to plan to
19
collect insurance in the event of a strike.
The analysis and results presented above can be heuristically ex-
plained by examining figure 2, As discussed earlier, point B represents
the outcome if neither side threatens any action but disagreement occurs;
the rent will be distributed according to the random variable A,
with mean a . Theorem 1 indicates that as the Players add appropriate
periods to their strike, the disagreement point moves in a southwesterly
direction; if insurance benefits are zero, the disagreement point moves
along the path shown as BO. The Flayers choose the strike threat which
A
produces the disagreement point d(S(0),4>). By (6) we know that the
anticipated agreement gives the parties equal gains from this disagree-
ment point. That is, the expected payoff from d(S(0),(t)) can be found
20
by moving along a 45° line to the frontier. The ox^ners would respond
by threatening a lockout of the remaining periods, as discussed in lemma
1. Graphically, such a lockout moves the disagreement point from
A A A
d(S(0),<()) to d(S(0),L), the origin. This moves the expected agreement
solution point in a northwesterly direction along the frontier, a move
that is obviously beneficial to the owners.
When we include the observed insurance benefits h > 0, the path of
disagreement points is altered as the effectiveness of each period in
the strike is diminished. BH is drawn with h so large that the disagree-
ment path never intersects the 45° line OE and has a vertical intercept
H=(n+l-6)h. The optimal disagreement point from the Flayers' perspective
A
is now d(S(h),(|)), as this results in expected payoff point G.
-17-
d(§(0),L)
If the Owners choose a lockout strategy other than L = {ifi}, they will
waive all insurance benefits. That is, the disagreement point would re-
turn to the origin, corresponding to d(S(0),L), a position less advan-
tageous to the Owners than point d(S(h),(i)); the agreement solution at
point G is more attractive than the lockout point E with respect to
Owner well-being.
From the Players' threat strategy, it is still clear that a threat-
ened discontinuous strike is optimal; an h > merely cuts down the number
of periods in the strike S as determined by Theorem 1. As shown in the
first model, the observed threat of a discontinuous strike is still ex-
plained. Additionally, the Or^ners ' choice of L = {(j)} implies h was large
enough to force the point d(S(h),i}i) above the 45° line OG in figure 3.
The Owners would not buy an insurance policy which pays a benefit so small
that they waive such benefits in favor of a lockout. The existence of
the insurance policy explains why d(S(h),(J)) was the observed threat point.
-la-
in. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has offered a simple variable threat bargaining model
which explains the hyphenated strike threatened in the 1980 Major League
Baseball season. It was shown that, given the special characteristics
of the industry, the optimal threat on the part of the Major League
Players Association may indeed have been to strike in discontinuous
periods. The existence of a strike insurance policy was sufficient to
guarantee that the optimal response on the part of the owners was not
to threaten a lockout. Thus, under a set of reasonable assumptions,
21
threats similar to those observed are optimal. VJe used Nash's solu-
tion to the game; we could have used many others and have found similar
results. We have offered a model which gives qualitative results quite
similar to the observed phenomenon. To consider the circumstances in
which equilibrium strategies might result in an actual strike before
agreement was reached, we would have to look to more complicated models.
For example, in games of incomplete information (such as might arise if
the bargainers didn't know some relevant variable like the size of their
opponents 'v/archest') bargainers in the early stages of the game might
seek to convey their 'toughness' through some preliminary skirmishing.
However, the choice of which periods in which to strike would continue
to respond to the fact that strikes hurt the Owners (but not the Players)
in some periods more than in others.
The approach used in this paper may be used to explain partial
strikes of all sorts. In the baseball industry, the systematic varia-
tion in revenue to management combined with the constant salary of labor
puts extreme importance on the choice of appropriate strike dates. To
-19-
find such strikes elsewhere, we may have to look at a dimension other
than time. In certain industries, a "discontinuous" strike may involve
a strike by only selective segments of the work force. For example,
workers for a vertically integrated manufacturing concern may find it
attractive to use strike threats at only the more capital intensive
segments of the vertical chain. The significance of such occurrences
and the relevance of the present approach in explaining them is an
area for more research.
-20-
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FOOTNOTES
The Sporting News . April 19, 1980. In the same issue, Tom Seaver,
veteran pitcher for the Cincinnati Reds, was quoted concerning the strike
as follows: "I don't understand It doesn't make sense, but
I guess there must be reasons."
2
New York Times sportswriter Red Smith, in the Sunday, May 25 edi-
tion, wrote: "After an edifying exercise in brinksmanship, the powers,
principalities and archangels of the baseball hierarchy averted a strike
by bowing in sweet surrender. In the dark hours before deadline, the
owners gave in and accepted the settlement that the players had proposed
and they had rejected a week earlier."
3
While the list of issues is too numerous to mention, a few are en-
lightening, if only as a benchmark to show the intensity of the free
agent issue. Briefly, the other main points of contention were the min-
imum salary that can be paid to any major league player, the owners con-
tributions to the players' pension fund, and the qualifications necessary
to allow a player to take his individual contract problems to binding
arbitration.
4
There has only been one previous strike in modern baseball
history; in 1972 two days prior to the opening of the regular season,
the players voted to strike. The issue was the distribution of a surplus
from the pension fund, which the players wanted distributed as benefits.
Tne strike lasted 13 days and 86 games were never played in that shortened
season. The compromise agreement involved giving equal shares of the
surplus to the two parties.
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As an example of the cost to the owners, the lucrative cross-
tovm series between the L.A. Dodgers and the California Angels was
cancelled; this series alone was expected to earn revenues of close
to $500,000 for the two teams.
c
The authors met with considerable (and most likely quite reason-
able) resistance in their inquiries as to the details of the strike
insurance. Indeed, the N.Y. Times revealed that the owners' negotiator,
Ray Grebey, had set up a fine for disclosing pertinent information
about the negotiations. Dubbed the "Grebey Discipline Code," the
maximum fine was purported to be $500,000. Even the usually obliging
owner of the Chicago White Sox, Bill Veeck, was understandably non-
committal in our phone conversation.
The Sporting News , April 19, 1980; page 7.
o
Any of a variety of bargaining solutions would serve our purposes
equally well. However, it can be shown that Nash's solution can be in-
terpreted as the expected utility of a certain kind of risk neutral player
for playing a fixed threat bargaining game (cf. Roth, 1979).
g
Recall the players' met to vote on the strike threat on April 1,
1980, which was just prior to the last week of exhibition games.
The reader is referred to related comments in the conclusion.
This is the Players' expected income at the time they must
decide to carry out the strike threat; i.e., before they know how the
issue will ultim.ately be resolved. Their expectations at this point
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are the relevant ones because, as the deadline for the strike to begin
approaches, these are the expectations which they use in their decision
to accept any offer which has been made, or go on strike. The same
applies to the Owners' income in equation (2').
12
The discontinuous strikes which we are studying would arise even
if we relaxed this assumption, as long as there is some variable effect
of time periods on Owner income. Thus, even if strikes hurt income in
subsequent periods, discontinuous strikes can arise as long as strikes
in different periods reduce owner income by different amounts.
13
The parties have incentive to reach agreement in such a bargain-
ing game as long as there is some payoff vector, xeT, which is superior
to the disagreement payoff vector d. More formally, a bargaining game
(T,d) resulting from a strike threat S is said to be non-degenerate if
d < X for some x in T. For instance, it would be sufficient to choose
S so that d = d(S) < xCa^) = (I (cSq), IqCoq)).
This holds for every S = {s^,s-, . . . , s, } such that
(i) S f"' {1, n} i {i>}
and
(ii) Za. - [k-(5] h >
ieS^
Equation (i) says that the threatened strike is costly to the Players
(I (S) < (I (o.„)). Equation (ii) says the strike is also costly to
the 0^<7ners;. the insurance benefits do not fully offset the lost revenue
(I.(S) < I (c<..)).In what follows, we assume the strike is chosen so
u u u
that (T,d(S)) is non-degenerate.
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Note that if k > 6, we know
a, - a. > h for i < <S11 —
be construction of S*.
case occurs if period zero belongs to the first 6 member subset of S*.
In fact, even if a^ - h < we may still have OeS. Such a
While there are no available records to indicate if all periods
prior to May 23 meet condition ii) while those after meet condition iii)
,
several pieces of evidence indicate the probability of such ordering.
First, the Players' negotiator, Marvin Miller, has been quoted (The
Sporting News
, April 19, 1980, page 6) as follows:
. If the players have to strike during the regular season, they
prefer to do it when the crowds and interest are mounting, with
the approach of the Memorial Day weekend. Naturally, the owners
would prefer a strike at the start of the season, when their
losses would be minimal because of rainouts, open dates, and
cold weather.
Secondly, examination of attendance figures shows that only one fifth
of the season's attendance occurs in the first quarter of the schedule.
Thirdly, television revenues from ABC begin at the end of May.
Clearly, Owners' income is not in perfect sequential ordering.
In this case, the optimal strike may be S = {s^ s, } where
ft *
s. through s, are a series of disjoint periods. Evidence suggests
that this pattern was considered by the Players in their threat deci-
sion. Mike Marshall, a relief pitcher for the Minnesota Tv/ins of the
-25-
American League, was quoted (The Sporting News , April 12, 1980; page 17)
as follows:
There has been some thought of selectively striking T.V.
games and games where large attendances are expected.
It seems clear that at least the decision-makers representing the Players
understood the optimal strategy defined by Theorem 1. Certain implemen-
tation costs and negative fan reactions which for simplicity are not
built into the model may explain why such selective-date striking was
not chosen.
18
In the 1973 negotiations, the Owners threatened a lockout and
the Players threatened a strike. As should be expected, an agreement
was reached prior to implementation of either threat.
19
It is interesting to note that in recent years the Owners have
threatened a Icokout on at least three occasions. In none of these
cases (1969, 1973, 1976) did the Owners have the strike insurance
protection they presently have.
20
In the absence of any Owner threat, addition of an extra period
A
to the optimal strike threat S(0) would move the disagreement point in
an unattractive direction from the Players' point of view. This is be-
cause the point d(S(0),(j)) is the most southeastern point on BO; addition
(or subtraction) of any period moves the disagreement point southwesterly
(northeasterly) which lowers the expected payoff to the Players.
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The second part of our model says we should observe agreement
after the threats have been established. We did not quite see agree-
ment prior to implementation of the Players' threat; they did strike
the last week of exhibition games. The immediacy of this first seg-
ment of the strike may have made any negotiated agreement to avert the
strike unfeasible. Additionally, see the following comments in the
conclusion regarding the possible reasons for such early skirmishing.
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